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Conrad’s Uncovering “Homo Duplex” Camouflage
One of the most often quoted and discussed of Conrad’s statements is 
a well-known phrase from his letter to Kazimierz Waliszewski: “In my 
case ‘homo duplex’ has more than one meaning.”1 This declaration is 
used by many critics as a key to both the life and work of Joseph Conrad, 
but this is also a great problem. How should we treat this ambiguous 
phrase: shall we try to univocalise it somehow, or maybe just emphasise 
its polyphony? Agnieszka Adamowicz-Pośpiech mentions that different 
conceptions of Conrad’s biography are usually conditioned by different 
methods of scientific examination.2 It is very significant, however, that 
what dominates is rather the second perspective of interpreting Conrad’s 
life and work, that is emphasizing its heterogeneity. Usually critics 
propose here two strategies: one, showing a long chain of different 
Conrad “lives” which could be possibly connected with successive stages 
of the author’s output; or another, emphasising a strong duplicity of life 
and literature in Conrad’s case, and showing it as a kind of coincidentia 
oppositorum hidden in self-fashioning.
Robert Hampson’s opinion on the first strategy is worth quoting:
Frederick Karl subtitled his biography “The Three Lives”; Bernard 
Meyer went even further and begins his biography with a 
reference to Conrad’s “five separate and distinct lives”: a “Polish 
gentelman-student; a sea-faring adventurer on French ships out of 
Marseilles; a British sailor who, by dint of his labors, attained the 
rank of captain in the Merchant Navy; a Congo River boatman 
1 Conrad’s Polish Background: Letters to and from Polish Friends, ed. Zdzisław 
Najder, trans. Halina Carroll (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 240.
2 See Agnieszka Adamowicz-Pośpiech, Joseph Conrad – spory o biografię (Katowice: 
Deni-Press, 2003), chapter 6: “Koncepcje osobowości Conrada.”
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caught in the sordid history of Belgian cupidity; and a lyrical 
master of English prose, the novelist Joseph Conrad.”3
However – notes Hampson – even if one were to demonstrate that 
Conrad had more lives than a cat, this would be approaching the issue 
from the wrong angle. Hampson proposes then the second strategy, 
which is inspired by Kristeva’s concept of the Other: a foreigner is an 
inevitable part of our identity, which is why the Other never will be fully 
the Same.4 Here we are dealing with a kind of dialectic very popular 
among those interpreters of Conrad’s output who discuss the problem 
of identity. I think that the best illustration of this perspective is Edward 
Said’s statement that for Conrad the very problem of personality “was 
still a question of either/or: either one surrendered to the flux of ‘ever 
becoming – never being’, or one’s consciousness matured enough to 
realize that order and the future were the results of self-assertion.”5 
The general sense of the “homo duplex” dialectic has become a very 
safe cornerstone for critics for presenting the “either/or” dilemma in 
different forms. For example, Said stresses here the opposition between 
order and disorder;6 Daleski, writing on the idea of self-possession and 
dispossession in Conrad’s work, also gives here a dialectic recipe: “one 
must lose the self to find it”7; of course classical oppositions like Pole 
– Englishman, writer – sailor, life – literature must be also mentioned. 
The conclusions are usually quite similar: the polyphony of identity 
makes a polyphony of narration, and Conrad is “hiding himself within 
rhetoric.”8
It is impossible and unwise to contest these opinions completely. 
I would like to remark, however, that these opinions reduce the doubled 
duplicity declared by Conrad to one dialectic level. Besides, the “homo 
duplex” notion is very often given a general and, so to speak, hazy 
sense. That is why, to save this doubled meaning of duplicity, one must 
3 Robert Hampson, Cross-Cultural Encounters in Joseph Conrad’s Malay Fiction 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000), p. 188.
4 See: Hampson, Cross-Cultural Encounters, pp. 188–189.
5 Edward W. Said, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 41.
6 Said, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, p. 82. Using Heidegger’s 
terminology, Said also shows here “a transition from concrete involvement (existenziell) 
to the universal human structure (existenzial)” (pp. 195–196); in other words, we 
are dealing here with a transition from pure ontic being to the universal ontological 
context of it.
7 H.M. Daleski, Joseph Conrad: The Way of Dispossession (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1977), p. 18.
8 Said, Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, p. 4.
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try to find out, firstly, what exactly Conrad means using the notion of 
“homo duplex”; secondly, what is the meaning he adds to the notion 
and finally why he does it.
In my opinion, for Conrad this very idea of “homo duplex” does 
not mean human duplicity in general, but has a very precise meaning. 
I suggest that in writing his declaration he could be referring to Alphonse 
Daudet’s Notes sur la Vie, where this dilemma is specified:
Homo duplex, homo duplex! The first time that I perceived that 
I was two – recollects Daudet – was at the death of my brother 
Henri, when my father cried out so dramatically, “He is dead, he 
is dead!” While my first self wept, my second self thought, “How 
truly given was that cry, how fine it would be at the theatre.” 
I was then fourteen years old.
This horrible duality has often given me matter for reflection. 
Oh, this terrible second me, always seated whilst the other is on 
foot, acting, living, suffering, bestirring itself. This second me 
that I have never been able to intoxicate, to make shed tears, or 
put to sleep. And how it sees into things, and how it mocks!9
I would like to underline the division of man into the spectator and 
the acting subject in this fragment as an essence of this “homo duplex” 
idea. And truly, at the turn of the twentieth century this double, who 
“sees into things,” gives serious “matter for reflection,” becoming one 
of the most popular philosophical themes. William James, who quotes 
Daudet, emphasises the need for balance within this duality: “This 
amount of inconsistency will only count as amiable weakness; but 
a stronger degree of heterogeneity may make a havoc of the subject’s 
life.”10 But even havoc could be useful, and this existential duality is 
a starting-point for a broad philosophical discourse built around man. 
It is sufficient to mention the meaningful title of Miguel de Unamuno’s 
work: The Tragic Sense of Life, or Gabriel Marcel’s dilemma: to be or to 
have. This strange combination of limitation and transgression we find 
also to be the basis of Emile Durkheim’s sociology: “On the one hand 
is our individuality – and, more particularly, our body in which it is 
based; on the other is everything in us that expresses something other 
 9 Quoted in: William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in 
Human Nature, chapter 8: “The Divided Self, and the Process of Its Unification,” 
accessed August 28, 2007, http://human-nature.com/reason/james/chap6.html. Conrad 
knew Daudet’s writings very well. He even wrote an essay on Daudet.
10 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience.
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than ourselves.”11 For Durkheim the dichotomy of senses and mind, 
instincts and morality, egoism and altruism, the sacred and the profane 
gives life to the idea of society:
Man is double. There are two beings in him: an individual 
being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle 
of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social 
being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual 
and moral order that we can know by observation – I mean 
society. This duality of our nature has as its consequence 
in the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral ideal 
to a utilitarian motive, and in the order of thought, the 
irreducibility of reason to individual experience. In so far as 
he belongs to society, the individual transcends himself, both 
when he thinks and when he acts.12
It is worth remarking that the “philosophy of ‘homo duplex’” appears in 
the transgression between those extremes: in this model of knowledge 
reason is in some way endlessly being moved by man’s existence.
Of course one would say that this existential duality is just a classic 
motif or even an archetype of man’s thought, and has appeared in 
philosophical works down the centuries, not only at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Although it is true, one must admit that only just from 
the beginnings of the nineteenth century did the problem of existential 
duality become the central motif of man’s thought, and somehow start to 
determine the scope of human knowledge. Paradoxically, this existential 
“irreducibility” of man becomes both the justification and the scope of 
man’s discursive practice. From now on man can be double: both the 
subject and the object of his own cognition, just as Daudet has argued. 
At the turn of the twentieth century man became the main condition 
for human knowledge.13 What is more, we can observe that “homo 
11 Emile Durkheim, excerpt from “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social 
Conditions,” in: Robert N. Bellah, Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, Selected 
Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 152, accessed August 28, 
2007, http://durkheim.itgo.com/assorteddurkheim1.html.
12 Emile Durkheim, excerpt from The Elementary Form of the Religious Life, in: 
Emile Durkheim: Selections From His Work, ed. George Simpson (New York: Thomas 
Y. Crowell Co., 1963), p. 93, accessed August 28, 2007, http://durkheim.itgo.com/
assorteddurkheim1.html. See also: Jerzy Szacki, Durkheim (Warszawa: Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1964).
13 I take “knowledge” in the meaning given to this term by Michel Foucault, 
Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 201: it is the “group of elements, formed in a regular manner 
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duplex” figure of man became the cornerstone of the scientificity of 
the humanities. That is why Michel Foucault has described this modern 
episteme,14 on which all the humanities are established, as being in 
a state of “the anthropological sleep.”
In The Order of Things Michel Foucault claims that “before the 
end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist.”15 Through the 
“epistemological birth” “man appears in his ambiguous position as an 
object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, 
observed spectator.”16 Thereby man’s existence is the precondition 
of human knowledge, and man’s cognitive activity turns into the 
“anthropological sleep”: “All empirical knowledge, provided it concerns 
man, can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation 
of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of 
all truth must be discoverable. […] the pre-critical analysis of what man 
is in his essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general 
be presented to man’s experience.”17 Man’s knowledge emerges in the 
hiatus “which resides in the ‘and’ of retreat and return, of thought and 
unthought, of the empirical and the transcendental, of what belongs to 
the order of positivity and what belongs to the order of foundations.”18 
This statement confirms Anna Grzegorczyk’s remark that in modern 
philosophy this motive of “existential rupture” dominates: we deal with 
various “cracks,” “rifts,” “tears,” “in-betweens,” ”differences,” “gaps,” 
by a discursive practice; and which are indispensable to the constitution of science, 
although they are not necessarily destined to give rise to one […]. Knowledge is that 
of which one can speak in discursive practice, and which is specified by that fact: the 
domain constituted by the different objects that will or will not acquire a scientific 
status.” It is also “the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak 
of the objects with which he deals in his discourse”; “the field of coordination and 
subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and 
transformed”; “possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse.”
14 Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 211, defines “episteme” as “the 
total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give 
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in 
which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, 
scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate,” in other words it is “the 
totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences.” 
So if “knowledge” means the epistemological model of some historical period and its 
context in general, “episteme” is the particular configuration of sciences built within 
this complex of cognitive preconditions.
15 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of Human Sciences 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 336.
16 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 340.
17 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 372.
18 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 370.
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“lacunas,” etc.19 Within this space, man’s existence and man’s cognition 
are turned into a kind of tautology, and the “homo duplex” figure 
becomes just a camouflage for the logorrhoea of discourse.
When Joseph Conrad admits that he is “homo duplex,” but provides 
that not only in one meaning, he takes a very specific position within this 
episteme. This other meaning emphasises, I think, cultural difference, 
but this is the difference that exposes the contextual limitation of 
man’s rhetoric and knowledge. This limitation sometimes results in 
an unawareness and incomprehension. Conrad’s characters never fully 
understand and are never understood; furthermore their duplicity can 
never be used as a kind of explanation or excuse.
We can observe quite clearly in Lord Jim that Jim’s experience 
and the conflicting intentions and acts are for him just a pretext for 
never-ending interpretations of his own existential situation. In my 
opinion Jim’s problem is not related to his “confounded imagination,”20 
but rather to his strange talkativeness. In the novel we find two brief 
remarks which put the light on Jim’s case from different angles: while 
Stein says that man “want to be so, and again he want to be so,”21 the 
French lieutenant sums it up in quite a different manner: “One talks, 
one talks; this is all very fine; but at the end of the reckoning one is no 
cleverer than the next man.”22 In other words, this existential problem 
of man shows up when a person, ignoring context, finds himself as the 
only heart of it. Somehow being amalgamates with talking in Jim’s case, 
which is why we have to deal here not only with the problem of one’s 
morality, but also with a kind of epistemological strategy built on man’s 
tragedy.
The narrator describes Jim as a person who had a skill of “enlarging 
his knowledge”23 independently of any experience, because “his dreams 
and the success of his imaginary achievements […] were the best parts 
of [his] life, its secret truth, its hidden reality.”24 But there is something 
more than that: “he managed wonderfully to convey the brooding 
rancour of his mind into the bare recital of events,”25 notes Marlow. 
That means that the efficiency of Jim’s rhetoric is a way of transforming 
19 See: Anna Grzegorczyk, Filozofia Nieoczekiwanego. Między fenomenologią 
a hermeneutyką (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, 2002), pp. 17–24.
20 Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim. An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Sources, Essays 
in Criticism, ed. by Norman Sherry and Thomas Moser (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company Inc., 1968), p. 54.
21 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 129.
22 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 89.
23 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 7.
24 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 13.
25 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 64.
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reality by detailed and subtle interpretations of his existence in a very 
broad, universal sense as a kind of “human” fate. Of course, during the 
inquiry after the Patna’s accident, the object of it is for him not just 
a “superficial how” but above all a “fundamental why,”26 but this “why” 
becomes finally just a strategy of translating mute experience into an 
existential sense. Jim needs bare facts then, but just to free his narration:
He wanted to go on talking for truth’s sake, perhaps for his 
own sake also; and while his utterance was deliberate, his mind 
positively flew round and round the serried circle of facts that 
had surged up all about him to cut him off from the rest of his 
kind: it was like a creature that, finding itself imprisoned within 
an enclosure of high stakes, dashes round and round, distracted 
in the night, trying to find a weak spot, a crevice, a place to scale, 
some opening through which it may squeeze itself and escape. 
This awful activity of mind made him hesitate at times in his 
speech…27
It can be said that the more Jim wants to escape from the facts, the 
more he uses them. The same takes place during his talk with Marlow. 
Although Jim assures Marlow that he doesn’t want to excuse himself, 
but rather would like to explain28 – he builds a broad interpretation 
around one jump and the insight and fullness of it are the reason he just 
“provokes one by his contradictory indiscretions.”29
To show the complexity of the Patna incident as an existential 
dilemma, Jim needs a man who would confirm a “human” community 
of knowledge and experience: “I would like somebody to understand 
– somebody – one person at least! You! Why not you!”30 he cries to 
Marlow. But this human presence is just a supplement for his story, 
a kind of pretext for his interpretations: “He was not speaking to 
me,” says Marlow, “he was only speaking before me in a dispute 
with an invisible personality, an antagonistic and inseparable partner 
of existence – another possessor of his soul. […] He wanted an ally, 
a helper, an accomplice.”31 But he needs this human factor only to 
expose abstract speculations on values, truth and the lot of man: 
“I was made to look at the convention that lurks in all truth and on the 
26 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 35.
27 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 19.
28 See: Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 50.
29 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 52.
30 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 50.
31 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 57.
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essential sincerity of falsehood.” So Marlow sums up Jim’s rhetoric. “He 
appealed to all sides at once – to the side turned perpetually to the light 
of day, and to that side of us which, like the other hemisphere of the 
moon, exists stealthily in perpetual darkness, with only a fearful ashy 
light falling at times on the edge.”32 That is why Jim’s “high-minded 
absurdity of intention” makes the “futility” of every episode “profound 
and touching.”33 And that is also the reason the Patna incident is just 
a “missed chance”34 for him. He wants to be “human” then just in 
order to validate his ideal of being a man. But he deals with his own 
existence very selectively and conventionally: for example, as Bruce 
Johnson points out, Jim rationalizes his attempt to dodge his betrayal 
by “shifting responsibility onto […] an allegedly will-less moment.”35 
In spite of that he’s just “one of us” for Marlow; but Marlow has also 
a “confounded democratic quality of vision,” which means that all he 
can see is “merely the human being,”36 in a disconnection from all the 
philosophy of man presented by Jim. But he has got another great gift, 
too: a talent for detailed examination of different contexts and points of 
view surrounding Jim. That is why Conrad can expose here the use of 
the “homo duplex” figure as a rhetorical excuse: we see Jim not through 
the eyes of one “man” only, but through the eyes of many people, who 
differ from each other so much.
Joseph Conrad exposes the deceptiveness of Jim’s “homo duplex” 
mind also by placing it in another cultural context. Patusan is “a chance 
he had been dreaming of,”37 just a blank setting for his self-fashioning: 
“His loneliness added to his stature.”38 This is all possible, because Patusan 
is for Jim just a kind of empty space, without any culture, without any 
reason, “land without a past, where his word was the one truth of every 
passing day.”39 For Jim the people and the land of Patusan are only the 
ground on which to realize himself. The apparent passivity of the people 
transforms his existence and adds firmness to his knowledge: “I’ve got 
to look only at the face of the first man that comes along to regain my 
confidence,” admits Jim and at the same time he makes this man mute 
and unreasonable: “They can’t be made to understand what is going on 
32 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 57.
33 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 119.
34 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 51.
35 Bruce Johnson, Conrad’s Models of Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1971), pp. 209–210.
36 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 58.
37 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 141.
38 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 166.
39 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 166.
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in me.”40 This is a minimized, but indispensable context for Jim; and 
“that is why he seemed to love the land and the people with a sort of 
fierce egoism, with a contemptuous tenderness,”41 notes Marlow. It can 
be said that we are dealing here with a kind of dialectic, which turns 
“spirit” (in the meaning of mind, rhetoric or knowledge) into reality by 
ignoring any cultural context. But culture has its own reason: it is ironic 
that Jim’s story, so carefully created by him at Patusan, moved into 
another context becomes a “Jim-myth”42 in which Jewel, Jim’s fiancée, 
changes into a precious stone.
Jim’s betrayal of the Patusan people originates in his realizing his 
own dream of a heroic life as well as his loyalty to the idea of conduct. 
This is the myth that provokes gentleman Brown to attack. Jim betrays 
the people because he gives himself up to the “bond of knowledge” 
between him and Brown, ignoring the context of the situation and 
the rights of the people of the Patusan: “[Brown] asked Jim whether 
he had nothing fishy in his life to remember that he was so damnedly 
hard upon a man trying to get out of a deadly hole by the first means 
that came to hand – and so on, and so on. And there ran through 
the rough talk a vein of subtle reference to their common blood, an 
assumption of common experience; a sickening suggestion of common 
guilt, of secret knowledge that was like a bond of their minds and 
of their hearts.”43 Just because he wants to be heroic, he does not 
treat Brown as a common criminal, but as the real gentleman that he 
always wanted to be. Paradoxically, trying to make his truth universal, 
he exposes his European knowledge; and following his duplicity he 
simultaneously betrays Patusan and misinterprets his own cultural 
ways of conduct.
By giving priority to cultural relativism over man’s duplicity, Conrad 
approaches the cognitive perspective typical of modern anthropology. 
As John W. Griffith points out, a modern anthropologist must be a “homo 
duplex,” because he is a “border-dweller.”44 Yet we must remember that 
this limit cannot be used as an excuse, as was the case with Jim. He 
explains: “There was no thickness of a sheet of paper between the right 
and wrong of this affair.” Marlow replies to him grimly: “How much 
more did you want?”45 For Conrad, cultural and contextual relativism 
40 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 186.
41 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 152.
42 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 171.
43 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 235.
44 See: John W. Griffith, Joseph Conrad and the Anthropological Dilemma: 
“Bewildered Traveller” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 14–15.
45 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 79.
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is quite different from man’s duplicity. And this is, I suppose, the 
heart of the problem of the double meaning of “homo duplex”: when 
cultural anthropology examines a concrete, but contextual man, the 
“anthropological sleep” of philosophical reflection makes concrete man 
just a subject of universal knowledge. Conrad tries to depict the modern 
“anthropological sleep” and to rebuild the tradition of reflection on 
man as a dweller in the world of cultures. I think that he never used 
cultural relativism just as an excuse. Even in his “autobiographical” texts 
such as Mirror of the Sea and Personal Record we will not find simple 
self-fashioning. These texts rather emphasise different contexts which 
have created man – that is why the figure of man as the one and only 
origin of reason and order just disappears in it, according to Stanisław 
Modrzewski’s remark on Personal Record.46 That is why Conrad is not 
“hiding himself within rhetoric,” but rather shows man within culture 
and between cultures.
This is the reason why Jim not only dies, but above all why he 
disappears: “And that’s the end. He passes away under a cloud, 
inscrutable at heart, forgotten, unforgiven, and excessively romantic.”47 
Only for that reason can we observe him from so many perspectives, 
in so many contexts, but not through the eyes of only one person. 
And just as man’s humanity cannot be an excuse for Jim, Jim cannot 
be an excuse for us. He disappears like so many other Conradian 
characters disappeared in a literal or metaphorical sense: Winnie Verloc 
and Brierly, who have drowned, leaving on their ships’ decks just little 
remembrances of their lives, like a wedding-ring or a watch; Razumow, 
who has lost his hearing; Kurtz, who has become reduced to only 
a voice; Renouard, who has just left his footprints on the seashore. This 
disappearance makes us search for the truth about man outside him: in 
the contexts that have created him and in the narrations that have been 
created about him.
I think that something quite similar has been suggested by Michel 
Foucault, when he states that one day “man would be erased, like a face 
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”48 That is why, trying to cross 
our “anthropological sleep” we shall try to face “man’s disappearance, 
not to take him as a starting-point in our attempts to reach the truth,” 
not to “refer all knowledge back to the truths of man himself,” not to 
“refuse to think without immediately thinking that it is man who is 
46 See: Stanisław Modrzewski, Conrad a konwencje: autorska świadomość systemów 
a warsztat literacki pisarza (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 1992), 
p. 156: “osoba autora w tych wspomnieniach ginie.”
47 Conrad, Lord Jim, p. 253.
48 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 422.
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thinking,”49 but to realize that “man is neither the oldest nor the most 
constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge.”50 In my 
opinion Conrad shows not only the metaphysical or epistemological 
consequences of this disappearance, but also the cultural context of it.
49 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 373.
50 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 421.
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Conradowskie odkrywanie kamuflażu homo duplex
St reszczenie
W początkach XX wieku w kręgu dyskursów humanistycznych pojawiło się 
nowe pojęcie – homo duplex. Lokując pozycję człowieka na skrzyżowaniu podwójne-
go kontekstu ducha i ciała, pojęcie to samo w sobie stało się pretekstem do niekoń-
czącego się dyskursu zamieniającego dramat ludzkiej egzystencji w antropologiczne 
uśpienie narracji w rozumieniu Michela Foucaulta. Sam Joseph Conrad twierdził, że 
w jego wypadku homo duplex ma więcej niż jedno znaczenie. Skonfrontowanie go 
z innym wymiarem ludzkiej egzystencji w postaci kontekstu kulturowego wyznacza 
strategie odkrywania kamuflażu, za którym kryje się właśnie „dyskurs homo du-
plex”. Ponieważ postaci Conrada niemal zawsze ulokowane są w przestrzeni pomię-
dzy antropologicznymi i filozoficznymi aspektami egzystencji, często jedynym lekar-
stwem na owo rozdwojenie jest ignorancja. Artykuł analizuje także tytułowe pojęcie 
w kontekście dylematów biograficznych samego Conrada, którego życie niemal na 
każdej płaszczyźnie, począwszy od kwestii tożsamości narodowej, a skończywszy na 
przynależności zawodowej, wyznaczały podwójne i często sprzeczne wymiary egzy-
stencjalne.
Marek Pacukiewicz
La découverte du camouflage d’homo duplex selon Conrad
Résumé
Dans les débuts du XXe siècle au sein des discours humanistes une nouvelle notion 
est apparue : homo duplex. En positionnant l’homme à la croisée du double contexte 
d’esprit et de corps, la notion en soi est devenue le prétexte à un discours infini, chan-
geant le drame de l’existence humaine en un endormissement anthropologique de la 
narration selon la conception de Michel Foucault. Joseph Conrad en personne disait 
que dans son cas homo duplex possède plus qu’une seule signification. Confronter cette 
notion avec une autre dimension de l’existence humaine sous la forme de contexte 
culturel, marque des stratégies de découvrir le camouflage, derrière lequel se cache 
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« le discours homo duplex ». Puisque les personnages de Conrad sont presque toujours 
placés dans un espace entre des aspects anthropologiques et philosophiques de l’exis-
tence, souvent le seul remède contre ce dédoublement s’avère être la solitude. L’article 
analyse cette notion dans le contexte des dilemmes biographiques de Conrad, dont la 
vie à tous les niveaux, à commencer par la question d’identité nationale, pour finir 
à l’appartenance professionnelle, était marquée par des dimensions existentielles 
doubles, et souvent contradictoires.
